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In this article we would like to concentrate on the figure of Georges Gurvitch1. 
Gurvitch developed a considerable body of work in the field of political philosophy, legal 
science as well as sociology2. But he did not limit himself to theoretical work: he also 
sought to intervene in and influence the social and political evolution of his time. Thus, 
while in exile in New York during World War II, in 1944 he wrote The Bill of Social Rights 
(La déclaration des droits sociaux3), whose purpose was to inspire the constitution of the 
French Fourth Republic. It is this form of intervention that we would like to focus on here. 
If it deserves our attention, it is because, beyond its mere historical interest, it allows us to 
readdress the question of the intellectual intervention of the philosopher in the social 
realm in an original way. What is unique in Gurvitch’s intervention in the social realm is 
that it is motivated by a genuine ambition to go beyond the aporia of a purely ideal 
approach based on the illusion of the omnipotence of ideas, all the while refusing to 
sacrifice the desire to strengthen the “hold of the ideal over the real”. Neither purely ideal 
nor purely real, Gurvitch qualifies his method as an “ideal-realism”. As we shall see, 
Gurvitch’s aim in The Bill of Social Rights is to render possible a more effective hold of the 
ideal over the real. 
 
1 A longer version of this article has been published in French under the title “L’idéal-réalisme de 
Georges Gurvitch”, in M. Maesschalck & A. Loute (eds.), Nouvelle critique sociale, Europe-Amérique 
Latine, Aller-Retour, Monza: Polimetrica, 2011, pp. 387-419. It can be consulted in open access on 
the website of the publisher (www.polimetrica.com). The authors would like to thank Joseph Carew 
for the translation of the current text. 
2 For a general introduction to the work of Georges Gurvitch, we refer the readers to the following 
books: R. Toulemont, Sociologie et pluralisme dialectique, Louvain/Paris: Nauwelaerts, 1955; J. 
Duvignaud, Gurvitch, Paris: Seghers, 1969; G. Balandier, Gurvitch, Paris: PUF, 1972; R. Swedberg, 
Sociology as Disenchantment, The Evolution of the Work of Georges Gurvitch, Atlantic Highlands: 
Humanities Press, 1982; F. Saint-Louis, Georges Gurvitch et la société autogestionnaire, Paris: 
L’Harmattan, 2005; J. Le Goff, Georges Gurvitch. Le pluralisme créateur, Paris: Michalon, 2012. See 
also Gurvitch’s intellectual autobiography “Mon itinéraire intellectuel ou l’exclu de la horde”, in 
L’homme et la société, n° 1 (1966), pp. 3-12; “My Intellectual Itinerary or ‘Excluded From The 
Horde’”, in Sociological Abstracts, 17/2 (April 1969), pp. i-xiii. 
3 La déclaration des droits sociaux, New York: Editions de la Maison Française, 1944. In 1946, the 
book was republished with some slight modifications (Paris: Vrin) and then published in English 
(The Bill of Social Rights, New York: International Universities Press, 1946). Here we will refer to 
the recent reproduction of the 1946 French edition: G. Gurvitch, La déclaration des droits sociaux, 
preface by C. M. Herrera, Paris: Dalloz, 2009. 
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However, we should stop ourselves from limiting Gurvitch’s intervention to the 
mere act of writing of this text. The Bill of Social Rights has to be read alongside his critique 
of the individualist position in legal science and his philosophical justification of what he 
calls “legal transpersonalism”. In order to come to terms with the multi-faceted nature of 
Gurvitch’s work, in this article we will show that his intellectual intervention must be 
understood as the completion of a three-fold task. We will take seriously Gurvitch’s claim 
that, if a Bill is to be effective, “il faut un idéal, une description des obstacles à sa 
réalisation et une technique particulière tenant compte des deux”4. In the first section, we 
will present Gurvitch’s critique of legal individualism. He tried to demonstrate that the 
individualistic prejudices of legal science drive a wedge between the concepts of jurists 
and the real life of law. In the second section, we will discuss Gurvitch’s attempt to justify 
legal transpersonalism. We will see that, according to him, the essence of democracy must 
be understood as the institutionalization of social law. Social law therefore comprises an 
ideal, which Gurvitch calls transpersonalism. It is not until the third and last section that 
we will focus on The Bill of Social Rights as such. Our thesis is that this text realizes the 
critique of the individualism of legal science and its concomitant justification of the ideal 
of transpersonalism by proposing a technique, which allows the implementation of this 
ideal in the social reality of his time. First of all, let’s start with the description of the 
reality of social law. 
1 The critique of individualism in legal science 
In the 30s, Gurvitch’s judgement on the state of the legal science was without mercy. 
An abyss had arisen between the legal concepts and the reality of the legal life of his time, 
an abyss mainly caused by the essentially individualistic bias of legal science5. For 
Gurvitch, individualism in legal science brings together a series of legal concepts which 
could be said to include, but are not limited to, the following principles6: the sovereign and 
autonomous individual constitutes the supreme end of law; the only function of law is the 
negative limitation of external freedoms of individuals; the individual on a small scale 
(man) or on a large scale (the State) is the sole basis for the binding force of law; and the 
only possible manifestation of the legal community is the submission of a multitude of 
isolated individuals to a general and generic rule. This constellation of ideas shows that 
from an individualist standpoint it is impossible to grasp new and emerging forms of legal 
 
4 G. Gurvitch, La déclaration des droits sociaux, p. 38. Proposed translation: “we need an ideal, a 
description of the obstacles to its realization, and a particular technique that is able to take the two 
into account”. 
5 See G. Gurvitch, L’idée du droit social. Notion et système du droit social, Histoire doctrinale depuis le 
17e siècle jusqu’à la fin du 19e siècle, Paris: Editions Sirey, 1932, p. 1. 
6 See G. Gurvitch, L’idée du droit social, p. 5. 
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institutions. Thus, in the field of labor law7, many authors emphasize the increasing role of 
non-state based, “unofficial” law emerging out of the spontaneous organization of groups 
composed of the parties concerned and their agreements. As such, this law could neither 
be produced by individuals between themselves, as in the case of a contract, nor by the 
“the individual on a grand scale” that constitutes the State, but rather arises from the 
group itself. This law refers to the objective element of the union of the parties concerned. 
Gurvitch sees in “collective labor agreements” an example of institutions, which 
pose insurmountable difficulties for an individualist conception of law. First and foremost, 
if it is made between two parties (for example, an employers’ union and a trade union), the 
agreement applies at the same time to these parties and individually to all the members 
that make up each group. In addition, the agreement not only applies to individual 
members of the groups of the contracting parties, but also to third parties (for example, 
non-union workers). Finally, collective labor agreements entail the nullity of all individual 
contracts, which infringe upon the clauses of the collective agreement. As Gurvitch 
emphasizes, these observations have led a number of scholars of labor law to see in these 
collective agreements an “objective autonomous law”. Such a law does not find its 
foundation in the will of the people nor in the commanding will of the State. Gurvitch also 
discusses various innovations of his time such as the “workers’ councils” establishing 
“workers’ control”. These innovations also pose a problem for a legal science based on 
individualism. 
Gurvitch’s thesis is that these insurmountable problems can only be resolved by 
incorporating the concept of “social law”. By social law Gurvitch means: 
“le droit autonome de communion par lequel s’intègre d’une façon objective chaque totalité 
active, concrète et réelle incarnant une valeur positive, droit d’intégration […], aussi distinct 
du droit de coordination […] que du droit de subordination, seuls reconnus par les systèmes 
de l’individualisme juridique et de l’universalisme unilatéral”.8 
We must determine what Gurvitch means by law of integration. Social law carries 
out the integration of a totality, a group, through the participation of its members in this 
whole. For Gurvitch, “le droit social fait participer directement les sujets auxquels il 
s’adresse, à un tout, qui à son tour participe directement aux relations juridiques de ses 
 
7 For an in-depth analysis of this question, see G. Gurvitch, Le temps présent et l’idée du droit social, 
Paris: Vrin, 1931, pp. 13-100. In this work, Gurvitch also criticizes individualism in legal science by 
questioning the legal innovation of his time in the field of international law and the discussions of 
the sources of positive law. 
8 G. Gurvitch, L’idée du droit social, pp. 11-12. Proposed translation: “the autonomous law of 
communion by means of which each active, concrete and real totality incarnating a positive value 
integrates itself in an objective way, a law of integration […] [which is] as much distinct from the 
law of coordination […] as from the law of subordination, the only ones recognized by the systems 
of legal individualism and unilateral universalism”. 
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membres”9. This law integrates a totality, but remains immanent to the members of this 
totality. Amongst themselves, members have “relations of communion”10, which Gurvitch 
symbolizes by his use of the pronoun “We”, instead of using oppositional or subordinating 
relationships (I, You, He/She). The expression “objective integration” means that the basis 
for the binding force of social law is objective and impersonal. Authority is not derived 
from an aggregation of wills nor from the will of the individual on a grand scale, but rather 
from the objective fact of union, namely from the “We”. When referring to this objective 
and impersonal authority, Gurvitch uses the expression “normative fact”. 
The individualist position in legal science is not only unable to account for these 
legal innovations, but also for more traditional legal institutions. We even need the 
concept of social law in order to understand the kinds of relations brought forth by private 
property law in a capitalist system. The reason for this is that, for Gurvitch, the law of 
coordination and subordination must be understood as a distortion and perversion of 
social law11. In order to illustrate this point Gurvitch uses, amongst others, the example of 
a factory environment12. When a worker is hired at a factory, he is subject to a whole 
series of obligations regulating the internal organization of the plant: work hours, various 
requirements for discipline and expectations of moral conduct, etc. These are “beyond 
consent” and fall outside of any contract. Gurvitch raises the question of the legal basis for 
the subjection of workers to these obligations. Such a base cannot legitimately be found in 
the property rights of the owner because such a right can only be exercised on objects and 
not people. For Gurvitch, the only legal basis for such workplace regulations is to be found 
in the derivation of social law from the legal totality that the factory as such constitutes. 
Thus, by enacting or establishing the law, the owner sets himself up as the legitimate 
representative of this autonomous totality. But, by usurping the title, the boss in reality 
distorts the social law that integrates the social totality that is the factory by making it a 
matter of individual property. The power he exercises, rather than being based on social 
law, is based on ownership. He considers the workers as things he owns. 
This thesis of a perversion of social law in the case of the law of subordination 
present in Gurvitch’s legal philosophy refers to the opposition between, on the one side, 
the infrastructure of an unorganized community and, and on the other, the superstructure 
of a superimposed organization13. For Gurvitch, any community, any social group, is 
composed of these two elements. The first is the “We”, namely the “normative fact” of the 
objective union. In relation to this first “stratum” or “layer” of the social group Gurvitch 
 
9 G. Gurvitch, La déclaration des droits sociaux, p. 75. Proposed translation: “The social law lets the 
subjects whom it addresses itself directly participate in a whole which, in its own way, participates 
directly in the legal relationships of its members”. 
10 See G. Gurvitch, L’idée du droit social, p. 18. 
11 See G. Gurvitch, L’idée du droit social, p. 12. 
12 See G. Gurvitch, Le temps présent et l’idée du droit social, p. 66. 
13 See G. Gurvitch, L’idée du droit social, pp. 28-30. 
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talks about unorganized social law. The second element is the superstructure of the social 
group. It is here that the social law integrating the group is organized. This organization 
can take various forms: collaborative partnership, subordinated association, etc. In order 
to be a real, veritable social law, organized social law ―the superstructure― must be 
“entièrement fondé et pénétré par le droit social inorganisé, qui se dégage de la 
communauté objective sous-jacente”14. So, when a superstructure takes the form of a 
hierarchical organization, social law is perverted into an individual right of subordination. 
As is the case for collective agreements under capitalism, it is thereby cut off from the 
objective community from which it emerges. 
2 The justification of social law: the ideal of transpersonalism 
As we said in our introduction, Gurvitch does not limit himself to a critique of the 
individualism characterizing legal science. He also attempts to justify social law from the 
perspective of political philosophy. It is this second aspect of his work that we will now 
focus on. In 1929, Georges Gurvitch published an article titled “Le principe démocratique 
et la démocratie future”15 where he developed his political philosophy. In this article he 
seeks to define the essence of the idea of democracy. For him in the history of philosophy 
the concept of democracy was developed as a synthesis of three basic elements: the idea of 
the sovereignty of the people, the idea of equality and the idea of individual freedom. His 
goal is to overcome the inherent limitations of the first formulation of a theory seeking to 
balance these three elements, which came into being in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries within the context of individualist thinking. For Gurvitch,  
“il s’agit donc précisément de savoir si l’individualisme unilatéral ressort de l’essence même 
de l’idéologie démocratique, ou si, au contraire, il ne fut qu’un prisme historique qui en 
détermina la réfraction […]. Il importe de savoir s’il est permis d’en rendre responsable la 
démocratie et si dépasser l’individualisme équivaut à dépasser la démocratie”16. 
 
14 G. Gurvitch, L’idée du droit social, p. 30. Proposed translation: “completely and utterly founded 
and penetrated by unorganized social law, which itself emerges from the underlying objective 
community”. 
15 G. Gurvitch, “Le principe démocratique et la démocratie future”, in Revue de métaphysique et de 
morale, 36, 1929, pp. 403-431. 
16 G. Gurvitch, “Le principe démocratique et la démocratie future”, p. 407. Proposed translation: “we 
must therefore know whether unilateral individualism emerges from the very essence of 
democratic ideology, or if, on the contrary, it was only an historical prism that determined its 
refraction […]. It is imperative to know if democracy is to be held responsible for individualism and 
if going beyond individualism is equivalent to going beyond democracy”. 
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As we have mentioned, for Gurvitch individualism posits the sovereign and 
autonomous individual as the foundation and the ultimate end of law17. This is not an 
individual entangled in the concreteness of the conditions of its existence, but rather a 
“représentant nivelé du genre abstrait de l’humanité en général”18. At the heart of this 
conception is therefore an abstract individual devoid of everything that makes up the 
singularity of its individuality. It is a metaphysical essence asserted as a fact, which allows 
us to establish the identity between freedom and equality. Furthermore, according to 
whether the emphasis is placed on freedom or equality, there are two possible variants of 
this fundamental principle19. Veritable individualism asserts that freedom is the 
inalienable expression of the essence of each individual, which only morality can deal 
with, and thereby reduces law to the external limitations that different free individuals 
mutually impose upon one another. In the context of a unilateral universalism, on the 
other hand, the emphasis goes on the idea of equality as already given because of the 
universality of the essence of humanity. However, unilateral universalism ultimately leads 
to a reduction of individual singularity to an abstraction: purely quantitative equality 
amongst different individuals. For Gurvitch, unilateral universalism completely confuses 
Justice with the moral ideal, but without Justice being elevated to the grandeur of the 
moral ideal. It is rather the latter that is downgraded, brought down to a lower level. Thus 
thinkers such as Plato and Hegel wrongly attribute to the state and its laws the absolute 
value of the moral ideal. If the starting point of universalism is thus the opposite of the 
starting point of individualism, their conclusions are nevertheless similar: whether we are 
dealing with a Justice that subordinates an individual to another or a Justice that 
subordinates everyone to the State, “cette Justice est menacée une fois de plus d’être 
confondue avec la force”20. 
Consequently, the ideas of law and democracy themselves are endangered when 
they are based on individualistic principles. For Gurvitch, the condition of overcoming the 
impasses brought forth by individualism and unilateral universalism is to create a new 
conception of law. We must think the possibility of a law which, all the while introducing a 
quantitative dimension, does not reduce the concrete singularity of individuals to a purely 
quantitative equality. Equality must rather be seen as the equivalence of individuals in 
 
17 When Gurvitch criticizes individualism as unable to account for the multifaceted essence of 
democracy, his main interlocutor is Jean-Jacques Rousseau. See, for example, G. Gurvitch, “Kant et 
Fichte, interprètes de Rousseau”, in Revue de métaphysique et de morale, 4, 1971, pp. 385-405 (first 
published in Kant-Studien, 1922); G. Gurvitch, “Rousseau et la Déclaration des droits. L’idée des 
droits inaliénables dans la doctrine politique de J.-J. Rousseau”, in G. Gurvitch, Ecrits russes, Ecrits de 
jeunesse, trans. C. Rol and M. Antonov, Paris: L’Harmattan, 2006. 
18 G. Gurvitch, L’idée du droit social, p. 5. Proposed translation: “a levelled out representative of the 
abstract species of humanity in general”. 
19 See G. Gurvitch, L’idée du droit social, pp. 97-98; G. Gurvitch, “Le principe démocratique et la 
démocratie future”, pp. 416-417. 
20 G. Gurvitch, L’idée du droit social, p. 98. Proposed translation: “we once again risk confusing 
Justice with force”. 
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relation to the whole. Everyone’s concrete vocation must participate in the same way, as 
an essential element, in the formation of the concrete universality of the totality. 
Correspondingly, we need to think the possibility of a law, which, under the protection of a 
quantitative freedom, at the same time renders possible the flourishing of the material and 
qualitative freedom of each concrete singularity. For such a synthesis between the 
freedom of concrete singularity and equality as equivalence to be possible, the third 
element of the essence of democracy, the idea of the sovereignty of the people, must be 
understood as the idea of a “tout organique qui puise en lui-même le principe de sa vie”21, 
of “une totalité concrète qui se détermine elle-même”22 and not as an expression of the 
rational will universally present in every individual. Here we come across the idea of a 
concrete totality and, which is intrinsically correlated to the former, the idea of social law. 
How can the introduction of this quantitative element peculiar to law allow it to 
found and maintain the deployment of qualitative freedom and equality? A first answer is 
provided by what Gurvitch calls “legal pluralism”, which is made possible by the 
establishment of social law. We have seen that social law governs concrete totalities 
without appealing to the state as the sole source of norms. Thus, a multiplicity of totalities 
may establish themselves in social space by counterbalancing one another and working 
together. According to Gurvitch, the future of democracy is to be located precisely in the 
universality and multiplicity of its faces. In fact,  
“si la démocratie a des faces multiples, l’individu lui-même s’en trouve qualitativement 
enrichi: à la multiplicité de plans dans lesquels se développe la démocratie répondent des 
faces multiformes de la personnalité”23. 
Thus, the quantitative element introduced by social law promotes freedom as a 
creative singularity by establishing a plurality of sites where it can unfold as truly 
equivalent to other freedoms in relation to the whole. 
From what we have just shown, it follows that any attempt to find a balance 
between the elements making up the essence of democracy, which wants to truly achieve a 
synthesis between individuals and universalism leads to the necessity of social law. We 
have seen that social law is the law by which every concrete totality is able to integrate 
itself in an objective manner. It is based on the “normative fact” of a community. We have 
already seen that if, on the one hand, the whole is irreducible to all its members, on the 
 
21 G. Gurvitch, “Le principe démocratique et la démocratie future”, p. 407. Proposed translation: 
“organic whole which finds in itself the principle of its life”. 
22 G. Gurvitch, “Le principe démocratique et la démocratie future”, p. 409. Proposed translation: “a 
concrete totality which determines itself by itself”. 
23 G. Gurvitch, “Le principe démocratique et la démocratie future”, p. 422. Proposed Translation: “if 
democracy has multiple faces, individual themselves are thereby enriched qualitatively: the 
multifarious faces of personality respond to the multiplicity of ways in which democracy is 
developing”. 
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other it is immanent to its parts and constituted by their collective actions. Because of this 
“continual transition” between the individual and the whole, Gurvitch defines its own 
philosophical position as an “ethical transpersonalism”. As Gurvitch lucidly explains:  
“Dans cette conception le tout étant distinct de la somme de ses membres, ne leur est pas 
transcendant et ainsi ne s’oppose à eux ni comme objet extérieur ni comme une personnalité 
supérieure (personnalisme hiérarchique); l’élément qui dépasse les "moi" personnels n’est 
ni objet ni personne, mais l’activité supraconsciente (Nous) à laquelle sont immanentes par 
l’intermédiaire de l’action toutes les personnes; cette activité, à son tour, est immanente à 
ces personnes et les pénètre. Dans ce sens de compénétration réciproque entre l’activité 
supraconsciente et l’action consciente, le tout transpersonnel, symbolisé dans le Nous, peut 
être caractérisé comme une totalité immanente”24. 
By this idea of a super-conscious activity, which he sometimes calls “a flood of pure 
superconscious creation”, Gurvitch designates the creativity specific to collective action as 
produced by individual actions which are absolutely irreplaceable, the latter being, in turn, 
rendered possible by their very participation in this collective action. Thus the point of 
view of an individual can be synthesized with the point of view of the whole: the idea of 
“We” allows Gurvitch to show the dynamic relation of mutual and immanent 
determination that exists between the two. 
We can begin to see that a shift has occurred with regard to the critique of legal 
individualism as we have presented it in the preceding stage of our argument. Speaking of 
social law, we are now at an ideal level. In fact, “la synthèse proprement dite en une 
totalité immanente de l’un et du multiple, de l’individuel et de l’universel, ne peut être 
acquise que dans l’idéal moral”25. The introduction of this ideal brings us back to the 
question of the relation between law and morality. Indeed, the moral ideal of a creative 
activity in which the singularity of personal actions is situated in a relation of reciprocal 
production with a transpersonal creativity remains unrealizable at the empirical level 
because at this level the conflict between individual values and universal values underlies 
every possible manifestation of the social. It is at this level that Justice intervenes: “la 
Justice est appelée à concilier d’une façon préalable les conflits réels entre les valeurs 
 
24 G. Gurvitch, L’idée du droit social, p. 10. Proposed translation: “In this conception, although 
distinct from the sum total of its members, the whole is not transcendent, beyond them, and is 
therefore not opposed to them as an external object or as a superior personality (hierarchical 
personalism); the element which exceeds or goes beyond each personal 'I' is neither an object nor a 
person, but a superconscious activity (We) in which, by the intermediary of action, every person 
exists immanently; this activity, in turn, exists immanently in these persons and penetrates them. 
Because of this reciprocal interpenetration between the superconscious activity and the conscious 
action, the transpersonal whole, symbolized in the We, can be characterized as an immanent 
totality”. 
25 G. Gurvitch, L’idée du droit social, p. 17. Proposed translation: “the veritable synthesis in an 
immanent totality of the one and the multiple, of the individual and the universal, can only be 
accomplished in the moral ideal”. 
Re-Thinking Europe. Volume 1 – 2011 
40 
transpersonnelles et personnelles”26. Establishing a law capable of reconciling personal 
and transpersonal authorities is indispensable for the formation of these “We’s”, which are 
now understood as the element of the ideal inscribed in the essence of the democracy. 
Only by social law can these “We’s” be established in reality insofar as these “We’s”, even 
while generating or producing it, found their very existence on it. 
Gurvitch therefore not only mobilizes the concept of social law in an endeavor to 
describe the reality of law, but also in an endeavor to found the essence of democracy. If 
these two paths take us to the same idea of social law, the first one leads to the 
acknowledgement of social law as a fact expressed in the spontaneous life of law, while the 
second one presents it as an ideal to be instituted into the social if one still wants 
democracy to have a meaning and a future. The problem that arises now is to know 
whether these two moments are sufficient in order for Gurvitch’s intellectual work to have 
a determinate effectiveness in the real dynamics of the institution of social law. On the one 
hand, it seems that a simple description of already existing forms of social law implies an 
excessive confidence in the fact that these forms could be instituted through the simple 
movement of the spontaneous life of law. However, we already know that Gurvitch was 
aware of the possibility of social law being perverted into an individual law. On the other 
hand, the mere formulation of an ideal remains too detached from the context where this 
ideal should be achieved and it is thus unable to grasp the specific obstacles that impede 
its achievement. Oscillating between a realist approach that limits itself to describing 
already existing realities and an idealist approach that develops an ideal without taking 
the real conditions of its effectuation into account, one must observe that this intellectual 
work should renounce any grasp on reality. This is the reason why, in order to rebuild 
Gurvitch’s gesture of intellectual intervention and grasp its full meaning, we must now 
explore a last level that allows the dialectical articulation of the descriptive and normative 
dimensions. We are here referring to the The Bill of Social Rights considered as a technique 
and a symbol.  
3 The bill of social rights as a technique and a symbol 
In this 1944 work, Gurvitch proposes a formulation of social rights which allows 
groups to be “centres actifs d’engendrement et de défense de leurs droits sociaux”27. 
Rather than formulating rights that ensure we can passively benefit from social polices, 
social law should allow for the self-government of groups and individuals. The Bill of Social 
 
26 G. Gurvitch, L’idée du droit social, p. 99. Proposed translation: “Justice is called upon in order to 
reconcile, in a preliminary manner, real conflicts between transpersonal and personal values”. 
27 G. Gurvitch, La déclaration des droits sociaux, p. 36. Proposed translation: “active centers in the 
generation and defense of their social rights”. 
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Rights does not limit itself to laying down this ideal in an abstract way. Gurvitch has 
designed his Bill by considering the specific obstacles that the effectuation of this ideal 
encounters in the social reality of his time. For Gurvitch, in the 20th century these 
obstacles are foremost present in the “economic feudalism” that the switch to capitalism 
has led to, that is, in the domination of economic life by great corporate shareholders, 
trusts, cartels, etc. Gurvitch also cites the following: the autocratic power of employers in 
factories; the strengthening of the financial oligarchy of banks due to the subjugation of 
industrial capital to financial capital; the development of technocracy and bureaucracy; 
various situations where the state becomes authoritarian, etc. This diagnosis leads 
Gurvitch to qualify his era as the “era of the Leviathans”28. Instead of spending a lot of time 
going into the specific details of these analyses, here it suffices to recall that the force 
Gurvitch sets in opposition to these obstacles is a pluralist legal technique29. This 
technique would aim at guaranteeing, against these Leviathans, the autonomy of social 
groups and ensuring that they could act as a means of reciprocal counterbalance through 
limiting one another. One of the central consequences of implementing such a technique 
would be the introduction of an Independent Economic Organization, governing itself, that 
would represent the whole of producers and consumers, and that would act to 
counterbalance political power. 
One question arises. Talking of The Bill of Social Rights as a pluralist “technique” that 
would allow us to bring forth democratic values in reality could appear problematic. What 
should we understand by “technique”? A knowledge that enables those who take 
possession of it to create social law? Is this not contradictory with Gurvitch’s legal 
objectivism? According to this principle, the compulsory character of law is not at all 
based on a Will but rather on the non-personifiable and objective authority of a normative 
fact. In fact, Gurvitch does not understand “technique” as a means to create social law. In 
his work The Idea of Social Law, he makes an important distinction between primary and 
secondary sources of the positive law30. The former are “normative facts”. It is from these 
facts that law draws its normativity. By secondary sources, one must understand laws, 
customs, conventions, etc., which Gurvitch calls “formal sources” of law. These sources 
constitute various “technical procedures” (procédés techniques) whose aim is to ascertain 
and express normative facts. Therefore, by proposing a pluralist technique of 
implementing democratic values in social reality, Gurvitch does not seek to empower 
individuals or the State with a technique which would enable them to ex nihilo create 
social law, but rather to offer technical procedures which would render possible the very 
expression of normative facts, the “We’s”. In particular, Gurvitch criticizes the absolute 
 
28 G. Gurvitch, La déclaration des droits sociaux, p. 54. The expression is from G. D. H. Cole. 
29 See G. Gurvitch, La déclaration des droits sociaux, p. 61. 
30 See G. Gurvitch, L’idée du droit social, pp. 132-144. 
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privilege given by some jurists to the secondary source that is law, the “fetishism of law”31 
which absolutizes a secondary source and makes the State the only source of law. His 
intervention therefore takes part in the criticism of the domination of a technical 
procedure which prevents us from even noticing the social law generated by the “We's” 
and offers new technical procedures to make manifest these normative facts. 
This objective of making normative facts manifest can be most clearly seen in the 
fact that Gurvitch expects The Bill to play the role of a “symbol” that would exert an active 
force on society. Here it is helpful to quote Gurvitch at length:  
“Les déclarations, bien qu’elles paraissent cristallisées, représentent l’élément le plus 
dynamique du droit écrit. Non seulement elles expriment le mieux le droit spontané, mobile 
et vivant de la Nation, mais encore elles communiquent ce dynamisme spontané à tout le 
système juridique organisé, en le poussant vers des transformations consistantes et 
immanentes. […] Le problème d’une nouvelle déclaration des droits n’est à ce point de vue 
qu’un aspect du problème général du renouvellement des symboles fatigués, problème si 
actuel à l’heure présente. C’est à ce prix seulement qu’on peut aboutir à une emprise 
renforcée de l’idéal sur le réel dont l’humanité a plus besoin que jamais”32. 
The symbolic dimension of The Bill of Social Rights, even more than its technical 
dimension, sheds light on the way Gurvitch conceives of his own intellectual intervention. 
He does not delude himself about the role a symbolic intervention can play in a dynamic of 
social transformation. In contradistinction to any sort of idealist belief in some kind of 
omnipotence of ideas, he understands that his Bill of Social Rights must be the expression 
of an already present reality in the spontaneous life of law. At the same time, and due to 
his conceptual constructions, The Bill of Social Rights allows the actors constituting this 
reality to reflect upon their action by providing them with the means of fighting against 
the obstacles impeding its implementation and, amongst other things, against the 
ideological blockages, which prevent them from recognizing the innovative range of their 
own creativity. Moreover, Gurvitch's intervention encourages the amplification of this 
creativity by transferring it to the organized instances of the life of law, which tend to 
block it because of their fixity. 
In this article, we have shown that Gurvitch's ideal-realism can only be understood 
by recognizing a third level, one between description and justification, as its true core, 
 
31 G. Gurvitch, Le temps présent et l’idée du droit social, p. 10. 
32 G. Gurvitch, La déclaration des droits sociaux, pp. 46-47. Proposed translation: “declarations, 
although they seem crystallized, express the most dynamic element of written law. Not only do they 
best express the spontaneous, moving and living law of the nation, but they also transfer this 
spontaneous dynamism into the entire organized juridical system by pushing it towards consistent 
and immanent transformations. […] The problem of a new declaration of rights is, from this 
perspective, only one aspect of the general problem of revitalizing worn-out symbols, a problem so 
relevant at the present time. That's the price we have to pay if we are to succeed in strengthening 
the hold of the ideal over the real which humanity needs now more than ever”. 
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where theory is indissolubly bound to an intervention. As a matter of fact, by conceiving 
social law as a technique and expounding it by means of the symbol of the The Bill of Social 
Rights, Gurvitch avoids formulating, in the same breath, an empirical theory or a 
transcendental theory of social law. Starting from the assumption of already existing social 
law, he asks what are the conditions for its institution, highlights the technical and 
ideological obstacles impeding this institution, and then proposes a new technique and 
new symbols which enable its implementation and open up the space for its amplification. 
Without ever leaving the immanence of the real dynamics of social transformation 
generated by the emergence of social law, Gurvitch formulates techniques which, because 
of their symbolic meaning, allow actors to reflect upon the movement which they take part 
in. 
Gurvitch’s intervention however raises a series of questions. What can guarantee the 
effectiveness of the “active force” which constitutes, according to him, his Bill of Social 
Rights? One must realize that, for Gurvitch, the active force of a symbol depends upon the 
prior existence of the “We”, in that language, by itself, cannot create a normative fact. Only 
then can symbols take part in its recognition and institution, as well as fight against 
powers likely to corrupt it. Thus, although utterly significant as an attempt to avoid the 
pitfall of the omnipotence of ideas, this conception claims that the Bill, in order to be 
effective, depends upon the spontaneity of a life of law, which it does not seem to have any 
power of acting upon. Indeed,  
“tout en s’appuyant sur l’ensemble des moyens de médiation offerts par les signes et les 
symboles, la sociabilité par participation dans le Nous reste fondée sur des intuitions 
collectives virtuelles”33.  
These collective intuitions constitute the first moment of emergence of a “We”, the 
moment which dynamizes all social creativity as such. But what is the nature of these 
“virtual collective intuitions”? Gurvitch does not seem to give a clear answer to this 
question. Moreover, the connection between collective intuition and the genesis of the 
normative fact is not even sought out, and, consequently, neither the roles that the 
intellectual could play in this process. Without a doubt, this lack stems from the strict 
application of the principle of juridical objectivism advocated by Gurvitch which excludes 
any introduction of the figure of the will ―whether it be in the figure of the individual will 
or the will of the state― in the question of the foundation of social law. However, shouldn’t 
 
33 G. Gurvitch, “Problèmes de sociologie générale”, in G. Gurvitch (ed.), Traité de sociologie, Tome I, 
Paris: PUF, 1958, pp. 155-251, p. 174. Proposed translation: “all the while relying on the set of the 
means of mediation offered by signs and symbols, sociability by participation in the We remains 
based on virtual collective intuitions”. 
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we ask how actors experience the processes of the institution of these “We’s”, as well as 
how subjectivities are transformed by participating in these “We’s”?34 
 
 
34 An interesting way of approaching this question has been proposed by Lucien Goldmann. He 
claims that social life can be accounted for only by considering the two correlated dimensions of the 
transindividual coherence of a collective subject and of the libidinal investment of the individuals 
forming this subject. See L. Goldmann, “Structuralisme génétique et création littéraire”, in Sciences 
humaines et philosophie. Suivi de structuralisme génétique et création littéraire, Paris: Gonthier, 
1966, p. 153. 
